In politics, as in physics, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Viktor Orban spent 16 years building a ‘Hungarian fortress’ – a state protected from migrants, liberal values, and the dictates of Brussels. However, the irony of history is that the siege did not come from the outside.
The keys to the ‘fortress’ were carried out by a man who had sat at the same table with Orban for years. Hungary did not betray its leader – the name Viktor Orban is inscribed in golden letters in the country’s modern history. However, young Hungarians, just like Orban’s own generation in the late 1980s, are demanding change – change that is no longer always understood by the elite of the former ruling party. How will the emphasis shift, what is Magyar’s ‘liberal conservatism,’ and who will address the problems presented by ethnic minorities?
Watching the video in which the political heavyweight Orban calmly and confidently speaks about the victory of the Tisza party in the recent elections, one gets the impression that the crushing victory of his opponent Peter Magyar came as a shock only to his entourage – but not to him personally. Over 16 years, the Fidesz elite had grown accustomed to electoral impunity, believing that its leader’s charisma would outweigh any political costs.
The ruling class became trapped in its own illusion: they believed they held a monopoly on truth, while the ‘youth’ were busy building careers in transnational corporations and flying visa-free on low-cost airlines. The Fidesz generation, which had endured the difficult transition of the 1990s, viewed 25% inflation as an inevitable but temporary evil that simply had to be endured. It was this elite that missed the moment when another Hungary – one that had grown up within the European Union – began breathing down its neck.
For young Hungarians, the ‘stability’ of recent years has become synonymous with stagnation. Inflation and a 50% increase in grocery prices, compared with Austria, which can be reached from Budapest in an hour, were seen as a sign of incompetent governance rather than resilience. This is what led to the crushing victory of the opposition in the April 12 elections. The Tisza party won 138 seats in parliament and, with such a majority, can amend Hungary’s constitution at its discretion.
What will change?
The main outcome for Hungarians is the end of an era of permanent tension. Orban kept society on edge by constantly pointing to enemies: George Soros, immigrants, the LGBT community, Brussels, the Ukrainian issue. These are not imaginary threats, but society has grown tired of living on the brink; there is a demand for predictable politics.
This is precisely at the center of Magyar’s agenda: rapprochement with the European Union, reforming Hungary, strengthening independent courts, and developing healthcare and education. The price of this is the return of more than €19 billion from EU funds. Magyar promised to resolve this issue within a month, and much of Hungary’s diplomatic corps will soon be engaged in negotiations to unlock this sum. What counter-demands will be made in exchange for this money, equivalent to nearly 10% of Hungary’s GDP?
Migration pact and guest workers from Asia
Migration was one of the main issues in Orban’s criticism of Western EU countries. Hungary opposed the EU migration pact approved in 2024 which will come into force in June 2026. The agreement establishes unified rules within the EU regarding migration and asylum for third-country nationals, including quotas for accepting migrants and contributions of around €1 million per day to a common fund for those refusing to accept them. Poland opposed the pact, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia raised serious objections. Magyar has also stated he will not sign it. At the same time, only 29 asylum applications were submitted in Hungary in 2024. Migrants usually see Hungary as a transit country to more comfortable destinations. Moreover, the peculiarities of migration legislation and integration are best illustrated by the situation of the Roma population – extremely poor and poorly integrated.
At the same time, around 400,000 residence permits were issued in 2024, mainly to guest workers for factory jobs. Ethnic Hungarians are unwilling to work for low wages and leave for better opportunities in other EU countries. According to the OSCE, about 50,000 people left the country in 2023 during the inflation spike. Meanwhile, Hungary must maintain its industrial capacity. For years, this demand has been met by migrants from Southeast Asia – Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
During the campaign, Magyar skillfully exploited this contradiction. His narrative was simple: “The Fidesz government is betraying the nation – importing cheap labor to depress Hungarian wages and please Chinese corporations.”
What happens next? The fence on the Serbian border will remain: Magyar is not reckless, and Hungarian society will not accept open borders. However, the “Stop Brussels” billboards and corresponding messaging on state television will disappear. Migration policy will become bureaucratic. Guest workers will continue to arrive.
Relations with China
In recent years, Hungarian-Chinese relations have been at their peak. This course was set by Orban in 2010 with the ‘Opening to the East’ strategy aimed at attracting investment for infrastructure development. Major projects include the modernization of the Belgrade-Budapest railway and the construction of battery factories for electric vehicles in Debrecen by Chinese giants CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology) and Eve Power (around €9 billion in investment), as well as a full-cycle BYD electric car plant, with around €5 million worth of investment.
However, since the 2020s, China has been labeled a “systemic rival” by the EU, and European institutions have slowed Chinese projects. The Belgrade-Budapest railway has been particularly affected by EU tender rules.
With Magyar’s government, Budapest–Beijing relations will no longer be on an upward trajectory. Magyar will not shut down factories, although he criticized “battery colonies” during rallies. However, China will lose its ‘political cover’ in the EU – Hungary will stop blocking anti-China initiatives, and preferential treatment will end. The future of the railway project will be uncertain and subject to anti-corruption audits.
Relations with Russia
Hungary has limited room for moves that would significantly affect Russian foreign policy – lifting the veto on a €90 billion loan for Ukraine’s army, nuclear and energy contracts, and supporting new sanctions.
Orban took part in previous EU votes for sanctions which were adopted unanimously, so it will not surprise the Kremlin if Hungary continues to endorse them. The Ukraine loan is geopolitical and depends largely on the EU’s real financial capacity – so Hungary's approval does not automatically mean cash from the EU budget will be handed to Ukraine.
The key asset inherited by Magyar’s team is the package of strategic agreements with Gazprom and Rosatom. Orban built a long-term energy security architecture, rather than just covering immediate needs. Dismantling this system would be extremely costly and difficult within one electoral cycle.
One major project is the Paks II plant, which is expected to allow for nuclear energy to account for 70% of all electricity generation. The cost is €12.5 billion (€10 billion financed by a Russian loan). Freezing construction is technically possible but would entail penalties. Most likely, the project will enter a slow “audit” phase, but construction will not fully stop.
Another key project is TurkStream. A 15-year contract with Gazprom (until 2036) supplies 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually via Turkey and Serbia – the only safe route for oil, according to the previous government.
Hungary also continues to receive oil via the Druzhba pipeline under an EU exemption, although operations were recently suspended. Alternatives like Croatia’s JANAF pipeline would be five times more expensive because of that government's transit tariffs. Thus, Magyar’s government will face no cheap options – either expensive maritime oil or ‘toxic’ Russian supplies.
The US
Relations between Budapest and Washington are entering a complicated phase. Orban hosted CPAC, befriended Tucker Carlson, and called US President Donald Trump “the hope of the world.” The White House reciprocated: Vice President J.D. Vance personally supported Orban before the vote. Magyar’s victory represents a failure of Trump’s bet. The US president is in a difficult position; the people he praised for their “wisdom” voted against his chosen candidate.
For Trump, Magyar is a ‘European bureaucrat,’ so instead of maintaining friendship with the US, Magyar will likely bet on NATO. His campaign promise to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 reflects this. Relations will remain pragmatic but without the previous ideological closeness – this is a language Trump understands.
The Vatican's stake
The most dramatic shift will occur in regions outside the country which have ethnic Hungarian populations – Transcarpathia in Ukraine, Transylvania in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia's Vojvodina province. The Tisza program suggests major changes: criticism of diaspora voting rights, the shifting of minority rights protection to supranational institutions (ECHR), and a revision of funding for foreign communities (which is denounced as “corruption” in Magyar’s program). In practice, this entails Hungary’s financial and spiritual withdrawal from the greater region. This creates conditions for EU humanitarian organizations and the Vatican to become the main actors.
Historically, Hungary has been seen by the Vatican as Antemurale Christianitatis – a bulwark of Christianity. It is a frontier between East (Orthodoxy) and South (Islam). Hungary’s mission was to filter Western values eastward while blocking eastern chaos. This perception persists, but Orban’s Hungary pursued its own ideology, engaging with Russia and China. Magyar’s rise symbolizes a shift in soft power geopolitics: returning the ‘keys to the fortress’ to the Pope.
Moreover, while for the EU Austro-Hungary is ancient, and often murky, history, for the Vatican it remains a meaningful project – the last great Catholic empire. From the Holy See's perspective, it was a perfect state, a large territory where religion was more important than nationality, and unity of faith was growing through borders. Restoring it politically is obviously impossible, but a spiritual revival is achievable. This will involve networks of Catholic schools, universities, and charities across Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, and Transylvania.
In conclusion, Hungary stands on the threshold of a major transformation. Its geography, political dynamics, and foreign policy orientation remain crucial for understanding European processes. Even within a broadly conservative-right framework, shifting priorities bring new actors forward and weaken those whose authority previously seemed impregnable. In the broader context of global change, such developments should be seen as part of a pattern rather than as accidents.