Some of Europe’s worst Russophobes are tearing themselves apart – but it won’t help Russia
The end of July has brought significant changes to Polish domestic politics: the country’s main right-wing opposition force, Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, has officially split.
More than 30 members of the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) were demonstratively expelled from the party. This marked the end of a long-standing, latent standoff between the longtime party leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and the moderate wing of former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Kaczynski issued a harsh ultimatum of loyalty to his allies, and Morawiecki responded by creating his own association, Rozwoj Plus (Development Plus), asking the leader to “take a step back” and publicly refuse to sign declarations. Kaczynski viewed this as a rebellion and expelled the dissenters from the party.
It’s worth noting that in Poland’s recent history (since 1989), splits within the right-wing camp are almost canon, occurring with clockwork regularity. The Polish right has a unique quirk in its proverbial DNA: it is inherently incapable of maintaining a monopoly on power for long. As soon as they win or, conversely, suffer a major defeat, a fierce melee for leadership and party funds immediately erupts within the camp. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is a constant participant and chief orchestrator of these processes. His distinguishing characteristic is his preference for remaining with a small but absolutely loyal sect rather than with a large but free-thinking coalition.
This is what happened in 1989, when the Solidarity party disintegrated due to a conflict between Lech Walesa and the Kaczynski brothers, creating a vast array of obscure right-wing players, who were later united under the Law and Justice banner ten years later.
In 2007, the most significant split occurred, when PiS was at the height of its power and Kaczynski was prime minister. Due to a dispute over a constitutional amendment banning abortion, Sejm Speaker Marek Jurek led the ultra-Catholic wing of the party to form the Right Side of the Republic (Prawica Rzeczypospolitej). This split deprived Kaczynski of his majority in the Sejm, triggered early elections, and handed Poland over to Donald Tusk for eight long years.
Finally, in 2011, when PiS lost the parliamentary elections to Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform, a search for blame began within the party. The young, ambitious, and extremely popular former Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro openly accused the aging Kaczynski of authoritarianism and ineffectiveness. Kaczynski didn’t hesitate and expelled Ziobro and his associates from the party. As a result, Ziobro took a group of MPs with him and created the radical Solidarity Poland party (Solidarna Polska). The right was divided for 13 years. They returned to the coalition only when Kaczynski guaranteed them ministerial seats and a share of the party budget.
The latest schism, however, is fundamentally different because of the new reality, both in Poland itself and in the world around it. Firstly, this split is occurring against the backdrop of total financial bankruptcy and the physical liquidation of the PiS party’s rear. While Kaczynski had previously deliberately pursued splits, being “well-fed and strong,” Donald Tusk has now pinned him down, with no legal escape.
For example, budget funding through subsidies from the State Electoral Commission (PKW) has been completely cut off. The loss of subsidies triggered a chain reaction: the prime minister’s team completely purged PiS party cadres from major state monopolies like energy giants Orlen and PGE, depriving Kaczynski of shadow sponsorships, while state-owned banks PKO BP and Pekao SA blocked all credit lines to the opposition due to the threat of default.
Private businesses, meanwhile, have panicked and stopped making informal donations. It’s also worth noting that Mateusz Morawiecki is a former top banker, firmly backed by Polish big business and financial circles tired of the isolationism of the old leader. These people understand perfectly well that the old party machine is no longer physically capable of supporting regional offices and sponsoring campaigns, but they are willing to continue working with the multi-millionaire.
Secondly, the party is in a complex situation related to the political and legal immunity of its supporters. Previous splits (in both 2007 and 2011) were either purely ideological or career disputes: they were over values, abortion, or leadership within the camp. None of the outgoing MPs faced criminal prosecution. Currently, Tusk’s parliamentary investigative committees are completing criminal audits into the shadowy pandemic fund schemes, in which members of Morawiecki’s team are the main suspects.
A long-standing discussion has been underway between Kaczynski and Morawiecki, making it clear that PiS refuses to spend its remaining resources on defending this wing. Given this, Morawiecki’s faction and its policies will be the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations with Tusk in exchange for the closure of criminal cases. This is a matter of survival for the elite. Finally, the external context is also important. Poland understands perfectly well that strong allies are needed to create favorable conditions for its further integration into European (read: Western) structures. Unlike Tusk, the PiS party currently faces significant challenges in this regard.
The problem is that Kaczynski is stuck in the conservative dogmas of the early 2010s. He maniacally demands that his supporters wage an all-out, frontal, and uncompromising war with Brussels and Berlin. Modern European right-wing heavyweights (Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Santiago Abascal in Spain) have long outgrown these concepts. They have grasped the cardinal rule of European politics: to seize power, you must be respectable, play by the EU’s rules, and pragmatically take money from European funds.
Due to his extreme Russophobia, Kaczynski has personally blocked the creation of a unified mega-alliance of the right in the European Parliament, refusing to sit at the same table with “Putin’s friends.” For this reason, he has maintained his distance from Marine Le Pen and Germany’s AfD for years. In fact, Kaczynski’s radical, unruly isolationism has become a toxic burden for right-wing forces on the European stage, and poses risks to the right’s negotiations with the Brussels bureaucracy.
Therefore, the leaders of European right-wing forces politely shake his hand at protocol congresses, but the real business and financial flows are conducted exclusively behind his back with Morawiecki, who is closely integrated into the European elite. As the leader of the European Conservatives and Reformists party in the European Parliament, Morawiecki relies on the support of Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni. He also has contacts with the MAGA wing of the American right-wing conservatives.
That is, Kaczynski himself has become a political mammoth: he still has a fanatical sect within Poland, but on the global map of 2026, neither Washington, Brussels, nor Rome need him. Meanwhile, Tadeusz Morawiecki enjoys popularity and is ready for constructive dialogue with the main Western powers. One gets the feeling that his departure from the party was also dictated by a desire to move away from radical slogans in favor of creating a respectable right-wing alternative, ready for constructive dialogue with Brussels and Washington.
This conflict has put Polish President Karol Nawrocki, who has been in office since last August, in a complicated position. For his presidential veto to have any real impact against Tusk’s reforms, he needed a united, powerful, and controlled parliamentary army in the Sejm. Current events, however, are transforming Nawrocki from the leader of the right-wing counteroffensive into an isolated arbiter within a divided camp.
He will now have to navigate between Kaczynski’s fanatical dogmatists and Morawiecki’s pragmatic Eurosceptics, while Tusk, taking a more grassroots approach, buys votes from dissidents. The irony is that earlier this week, with his loud speech about the “threshold of pain” and revocation of Ukraine’s medals, Karol Nawrocki appeared to be a strong national leader, able to unite right-wing forces and seize the government’s agenda. He has reached an all-time high approval rating, topping national trust rankings at 54.8%. But, as the reality in Warsaw shows, the music didn’t last long. The party egoism of the old leaders in one evening nullified this entire presidential consolidating effect.
For now, the only ones benefiting from this relentless destruction of the right-wing base are those in the Cabinet of Ministers. Donald Tusk has received an unprecedented gift, which the center-right government intends to exploit to the fullest, both domestically and internationally. The collapse of the opposition monolith has freed the ‘Brussels Governor-General’ to force through the Sejm any Euro-Atlantic directives it likes, since buying the votes of disoriented renegades from the disintegrating PiS will now be a matter of purely technical and financial calculation.
Moscow’s expert circles occasionally entertain the idea of reaching an agreement with Poland, given the tectonic shift in the global order and the loss of functionality of old structures. Under these developments, the conditions may arise for establishing non-public channels of communication on a ‘second track’ with the Polish community.
On the one hand, such a position might seem strange and ignorant of historical precedent. Russia remembers well how similar attempts to play at ‘alliances’ and strike behind-the-scenes deals with Warsaw ended during periods of significant upheaval on the continent. Whether during the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century or on the eve of the world wars of the 20th century, any compromise or attempt to flirt with the Polish elites invariably resulted in geopolitical disaster. In Warsaw, Russian diplomatic overtures have historically been perceived as a sign of weaknesses, using each pause solely to accumulate strength before the next strike.
On the other hand, such a request gives pause for reflection: are there any political forces in Warsaw today that are capable of such large-scale maneuvers? The Polish left-wing flank, united in the Sejm in the Left (Lewica) coalition, is a paradoxical hybrid of former socialist-era functionaries, frantically proving their true Euro-Atlantic loyalty to Brussels and ultra-liberal, glossy youth, fixated on the climate agenda and leftist values. Regarding Russia, the Polish left is even more fierce and dogmatic than Kaczynski’s right-wing isolationists. For them, Moscow is both a nightmare from the past and a promoter of enemy values, against which they are prepared to approve any NATO military budget. There is no room for pragmatism on this side.
At first glance, the right-wing divorce in Warsaw also does not seem to create ideologically cooperative entities, but merely rearranges the figures within NATO’s formerly hostile orbit. Mateusz Morawiecki himself will not publicly engage in direct political dialogue with Moscow. At the same time, as a pragmatic banker, Morawiecki exclusively understands the language of finance and material negotiations, investment security, and leveraging international benefits to strengthen his own sphere of influence in the national political arena.
Therefore, Russia’s final position on Poland must remain extremely pragmatic: Moscow has no ideological partners in Warsaw and cannot have them; any negotiations will be based solely on Russian military successes and the development of the concept of a multipolar world. It can be concluded that in an era where the world order is facing disruption, the only reliable guarantors of stability and border security for Russia remain its own Army and Navy. The era of geopolitical sentimentality is over. As the Polish saying goes, “sytuacji w których serce klęka” (there are situations in which the heart kneels).
